Singapore's technological prowess as one of the most networked city, society and nation is reflected in most statistical data. Indeed, Singapore is relentless in its pursuit of making technological and Internet history/ies. In its latest Intelligent Nation 2015 (iN2015) master plan, Singapore plans to integrate all aspects of info-communications into a single ultra-fast broadband platform that will be capable of delivering ultra-fast Internet. This paper provides a brief update on the extent of technological and Internet deployment. More importantly, it looks at how the Internet has further developed by analysing the events surrounding the 2006 General Elections in Singapore. Each election in Singapore is arguably a key regulatory milestone for the Internet because new rules are either invoked via new or revised legislation or new warnings issued to keep a lid on the effectiveness of new technologies. While Singapore has undoubtedly made 'history' in its regulatory approaches and strategies in managing the liberatory impulses, with outright censorship of racial, religious and pornographic -and, since 11 September 2001 (9/11), terrorist-related -websites making headlines around the world, it has also been able to score impressively in the technological competencies of its citizens. In the discussion that follows, we examine the current state of the Singaporean blogosphere and considers if the regulatory landscape has been altered following pressures brought about by blogs and other alternative websites. It argues that the implementation of both overt and subtle controls of alternative political websites as well as heavy-handed actions by the authorities to rein in on errant Internet users and bloggers, along with the occasional talking-down of the significance of the Singaporean blogosphere, have accentuated the ambivalence that the Internet in Singapore has (re)presented.
one of the best in the world (if not the very best), but the social, cultural and political targets are ambitious and telling. According to the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA), the government agency responsible for regulating the telecommunications and info-communications (or 'infocomm' for short) industry and rolling out the iN2015 master plan (IDA 2006b ):
• Singapore to be No. 1 in the world in harnessing infocomm to add value to the economy and society.
• Achieve a two-fold increase in value-added 4 of the infocomm industry to S$26 billion.
• See a three-fold increase in infocomm expert revenue to S$60 billion.
• Create 80,000 additional jobs.
• Have at least 90 per cent of homes using broadband.
• Ensure 100 per cent computer ownership for all homes with school-going children.
These figures are impressive by any measure, but judging by the way in which the IT2000 plan was carried out through the 1990s, what is perhaps more impressive is the obsessive manner which the Singapore government is expected to employ to get the job done (just as it had done in the past). On the surface, and looking at the targets cited above, iN2015 appears to be nothing more than an upgraded IT2000 plan catering for the digital demands of the twenty-first century. There are, however, differences in the way terms like 'technology' and 'intelligence' are presented as critical human enablers -hence the shift from 'intelligent island' to 'intelligent nation' in the naming of the iN2015 master plan, where the 'nation' (N) is deliberately emphasised. As the iN2015 Report notes:
The [iN2015] Committee recognises that infocomm alone will not be sufficient to transform the country's economic sectors. Neither will infocomm on its own change mindsets on how integration can yield benefits, how new opportunities can be realised by accessing international markets, or the extent to which service quality can be raised in an industry. However, infocomm can be a critical enabler to achieving all of these. […] Apart from boosting Singapore's economic competitiveness, infocomm will be used to enrich the lives of every individual here [i.e. in the nation of Singapore] (IDA 2006: 8-9) .
The emphases on 'mindsets' and the 'individual' thus enable the IDA and the government to sidestep potential criticisms about poor content development and broader management of the project. Singapore's high level of IT use and status as a technological society. It reported then that about 46% of adults, age 18 and up, were active users of the Internet. 5 The number is markedly higher for local Singaporean students, many of whom are being IT-trained and exposed from early childhood, with Internet penetration at 71% and rising (Kuo et al. 2002: 100) . Even 'non-users' -defined in the SIP Report as people who do not access the Internet due to three key reasons: did not know how, no time and no interest -were found to be generally supportive of Internet use and development. As Barry has pointed out, while citizens of a technological society are expected to have 'a certain knowledge of technology, and to make choices on the basis of this knowledge', not everyone will be 'willing or able to meet these expectations ' (2001: 29) . At the very minimum, it is crucial that such people do not become hindrances to the 'technologizing' process of turning computers and the Internet into essential tools for the conduct of everyday life. Singapore appears to have done remarkably well in this regard, so much so that the government has come to define the 'digital divide' as 'the gap between those who are Internet savvy and those who are not' (George 2003: 6) .
The supposed digital gap in Singapore has been narrowed in recent times. (Ang 2007: 21) . By May 2007, total Internet subscription stood at 2,318,300, which is more than 60% of the total population of Singapore (ibid.). Since 2001, Singapore has been deemed to be more connected than developed countries like the United States, Australia and Britain (Lee 2005a ). In addition,
According to the
Singapore boasts a fixed line telephony penetration rate of 98.4% and mobile phone penetration at 103.4% in 2006 (Ang 2007: 21) .
To better appreciate the significance of the 2002 SIP study as well as surveys that followed -and will follow in the future -the notion of 'Internet use' needs to be put into perspective. The SIP team identified the two main purposes of the Internet as 'a source of information and as a tool for communication' (Kuo et al. 2002: 8) . The researchers found that emails and information searches were by far the most popular Internet activities, followed by entertainment and online discussions. E-commerce activities, most commonly carried out in online shopping and browsing for goods and services, were not as popular due largely to concerns about transactional security and privacy protection (Kuo et al. 2002: 103-4 interactive online gaming and other multi-media tools as the key applications (Lee 2005a ).
The relatively slow take-up of basic e-commerce and new media activities in Singapore contradicts the expressed goal of the government for Singaporeans to embrace new technologies for economic growth. This anomaly can be explained by looking at another aspect of the SIP report: the perception that the Internet has not led to a stronger sense of civic and political empowerment (Kuo et al. 2002: 111) . According to the SIP researchers, the percentages of users who believe that the Internet enables increased engagement on government policies and political issues is extremely low at less than 20%. In other words, the vast majority of Singaporeans do not consider the Internet to be useful for political engagement and civic participation. On one level, public disinterest in political uses of the Internet could be attributed to the PAP government's intolerance of political dissent and the ongoing presence of OB (out-of-bounds) markers 7 , along with other ambiguous rules circumscribing political participation both offline as well as online (Lee 2005a and 2005b Gomez 2000 and , believing that technology is value neutral and can therefore 'provide ways of avoiding political disagreements' (Barry 2001: 8) . This belief buys in to a determinist perspective of the Internet which argues that the introduction of the Internet, with its decentred mode of communication, would inevitably democratise government (Warschauer 2001: 305) . At the same time and in contrast, the Singaporean authorities appear to adopt a more instrumental view of technology (Feenberg 1991) with the belief that the Internet and all new technologies can not only be tamed and controlled, they can even be used to increase and strengthen centralised control (Warschauer 2001: 305) .
Singapore is particularly interesting in that its instrumental perspective has not quite undermined its pro-development mentality, with its fast-growing online infrastructure and continued ability to regulate the Internet for its own ends and purposes testament to its ability to manage -for better or worse -what Castells has referred to as the contradiction between the net and the self (Castells 1996 and . Warschauer (2001: 310) Singapore has become famous/notorious for: while Singapore has undoubtedly made 'history' in its regulatory approaches and strategies in managing the liberatory impulses, with outright censorship of racial, religious and pornographic -and, since 11 September 2001 (9/11), terrorist-related -websites making headlines around the world, it has also been able to score impressively in the technological competencies of its citizens (as illustrated earlier in the paper). In the discussion that follows, we examine the current state of the Singaporean blogosphere, considering in the process whether the regulatory landscape has been altered following the explosion of blogs and other alternative sites. It concludes that the implementation of both overt and subtle controls of alternative political websites as well as heavy-handed actions by the authorities to rein in errant Internet users and bloggers, along with the occasional talking-down/dismissal of the significance of the Singaporean blogosphere, have accentuated the ambivalence that the Internet in
Singapore has presented, and will continue to present.
THE 2006 GENERAL ELECTION AND BEYOND
The Government has to adapt to the digital age... We will use the new mediamultimedia, podcasts, vodcasts -all these things which you get in the Internet or somebody sends to you by e-mail... So we have to update, we have to try these out and we have to move with the times, and when our laws have to change, like our laws governing podcasts during elections or our laws on political videos, these are things which we have to update as we go along. (Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 2006a) From its humble beginnings as a simplified web publishing tool used initially for online journals, the blog has progressively become a force to be reckoned with in a globalised observers to call this, with tongue-in-cheek -Singapore's first 'internet election' (Gomez 2006: 2) . Subsequently, the government acknowledged after the conclusion of the election that it had to 'update' and 'adapt to the digital age' or risk political ossification (Lee, H.L. 2006b ).
Later that year, The Straits Times launched its much vaunted web-platform for 'citizen journalism', STOMP (which stands for: Straits Times Online Mobile Print), which included a motley crew of celebrity bloggers who engage in social commentary. mr brown (sic) is entitled to his views. But opinions which are widely circulated in a regular column in a serious newspaper should meet higher standards...he should come out from behind his pseudonym to defend his views openly. It is not the role of journalists or newspapers in Singapore to champion issues, or campaign for or against the Government. If a columnist presents himself as a non-political observer, while exploiting his access to the mass media to undermine the Government's standing with the electorate, then he is no longer a constructive critic, but a partisan player in politics (Bhavani 2006 ).
The PAP's castigation of mrbrown's comments was problematic on two counts:
on one hand, the authorities read into his article a direct attack on the government's mandate to rule (which was really not apparent to anyone reading the opinion piece).
While conveniently avoiding the issues and disregarding the views expressed in the article, his critic swooped on the motivation of its author, assuming to know his intentions by calling him a 'partisan player in politics' (Bhavani 2006) . On the other hand, the government has always demonstrated a strong disdain for online anonymity and pseudonymity, questioning the validity and rationality of views on the 'faceless' Internet -a largely unregulated space which the ruling elites view as 'chaotic and disorganised, with many half-truths and untruths masquerading as fact' . From this perspective, the PAP argues that it is in fact irrational to expect that every voiceespecially anonymous ones -should be accorded the same privilege of an equal hearing in an environment where, for instance, 'terrorists' and 'paedophiles' can also operate (Lee, H.L. 2006a: 10) . In a post 9/11 climate, this line of reasoning strikes an audible chord in the mostly conservative Singaporean psyche, as evinced by the widespread public support for strong media regulations that filter out the 'evils' of the Internet such as religious radicalism and child pornography (Chia 2006; Kwek 2007; Quah 2006 ).
The mrbrown episode gave the government another opportunity to reiterate -for the umpteenth time -that the legitimate role of Singaporean public discourse and the media is to contribute to nation building and social cohesion, and not to trespass into the political arena as an advocate of issues (see Chan 1994; and Lee, H.L. 2006a ). The government's response also highlighted the fact that the medium is important in determining the legitimacy and regulatory applicability of all discourses. The point that the government succeeded in conveying to Singaporeans was that while comments made on a blog would have been dismissed as 'Internet chatter' (Ho 2006) , similar opinions expressed in the mainstream media have the potential for greater reach and impact, and as such more responsibility and restraint needs to be exercised (Bhavani 2006) . A distinction was thus made between the blogosphere and the mainstream media. As would be expected in Singapore, Lee's column was duly suspended and he was permanently removed from the newspaper's guest columnist list -in what could be construed as a relatively light penalty.
Prior to the 2006 General Election, although media regulators and authorities generally left the blogosphere to its own devices (subject of course to pre-existing Internet codes, guidelines and warnings), when it came to the breaching of political boundaries (OB-markers), the response was swift and decisive. The PAP government's approach towards dealing with blog(ger)s deemed to be seditious, at this stage of Singapore's Internet history, was -reminiscent of Foucault's (1977) description of the society of sovereignty, characterised by juridical power -to resort to regulation via available laws to rebuke and punish offenders. In this hostile auto-regulatory environment, it would have been difficult for Singaporeans to imagine blogs gaining legitimacy in the media and public sphere, let alone witnessing government ministers indulging in blogging or engaging bloggers online.
After the events of the election, however, the PAP government tacitly conceded that the potential of blogs and the Internet-led new media revolution meant that it too had to engage the online medium (Lee, H.L. 2006b; Lee 2005a and 2005b) . Likewise, the mainstream media's antagonistic position on blogs took a subtle turn, with journalists and editorials acknowledging that blogging is not mere Internet chatter and should thus be taken -and regulated -more seriously (Ho 2006) . Soon after, either as a consequence of ongoing 'blogospheric pressures' or in correspondence with the state's 'about turn', blogs rapidly became accepted as part of the media landscape, with many government agencies and politicians joining the fray. Along with this de facto, yet somewhat 'official', acknowledgement of the inevitable and eventual 'mainstreaming' of online discourses in Singapore came increased calls, led by the state and its media, to institute principles of responsible use and self-regulation for blog(ger)s.
The notion of a blogger code began to gain currency in the public and, more importantly, within the Internet community after the election in 2006. The debate over blogger ethics was resurrected in December 2006 when an opinion piece was written in TODAY newspaper by a corporate counsel -who was also a blogger -suggesting that it was time that bloggers consciously regulated themselves (Yadav 2006) . For a brief period, the Singaporean blogosphere was divided between those who were amenable to a blogger code of ethics and those who were adamantly opposed to it. Although the blogging community -being generally alternative and anti-establishment -was still largely opposed to regulation, as another reputable blogger pointed out, what was different this time was:
While most bloggers (including myself) are generally not in favour of the formation of such an association or any form of self-regulation from an external authority, there is one valid issue raised that we might need to look into. That issue is about educating the starting bloggers (the young, the brash and the reckless types) who might end up in getting themselves to trouble (Leong 2007, emphasis added) There was a subtle shift in the discourse of blogging from one of judicial, punitive regulatory tactics to one of 'education' -or as Foucault (1977) would term it, 'discipline' -which is nevertheless an element of regulatory practice in Singapore (Lee 2005a) . Collectively, these actions not only represent the escalation of Internet regulatory controls on the blogosphere, they also constitute grids of specification which impose various subjectivities onto bloggers -dividing them both from others and within themselves. Those who play by the rules and enforce self-regulation inadvertently position themselves as more 'rational' than other bloggers who persist in their contentious or anonymous diatribes. Blogger Bernard Leong (2006) commented, with some irony, that the greatest implication of the PAP's covert counter-insurgency movement was the potential fragmentation of the blogosphere, since it became more difficult to distinguish between anti-establishment, moderate and pro-establishment voices that hide behind anonymity.
CONCLUSION
Guided by a strong, capable government, Singapore has fully embraced technological modernization as a development tool. At the same time, it is widely considered to be one of the most sophisticated authoritarian systems in history. Attempting to steer a narrow path between these two policies, the government of Singapore has tried to expand the use of the Internet among its citizens, while retaining political control over this use by censoring service providers (Castells 2001: 164) .
Most academic research on Singapore media and politics have taken on a pessimistic view of Internet liberalisation in the island-state, due to the continued survival and ability of the Singaporean state to apply hegemonic rule and disciplinary power over media and public discourses (Lee 2000 (Lee , 2004 (Lee , 2005a (Lee and 2005b George 2003 George , 2005 . Terence Lee (2005a; see also Lee and Birch 2000) uses the term 'auto-regulation' to describe the automated, internalised and panoptic nature of regulatory power perfected by the government in the media and public sphere, ensuring their own self-censorship and 'docility'. Cherian George (2005) argues that the media regulatory tactics used in the authoritarian city-state are more subtle than are usually perceived. He proposes the term 'calibrated coercion' to describe the carefully calculated, intelligent and nuanced nature of the power exercised by the government in achieving hegemony and maintaining the political status quo in the public and the media (ibid. Manuel Castells, in the quote above, uses Singapore's ambivalence towards technology and the online media to illustrate his point that the Internet is neither an instrument of freedom and democracy nor a weapon of one-sided control and domination (Castells 2001: 164) . This in-between 'narrow path' is highly reflective of the political strategy of Internet auto-regulation that Singapore has been aiming to perfect (Lee 2005a ).
The discourse of the Internet -and by the same token, the regulations governing the The Singapore Government has categorically stated that its media will be different from those of other countries. However, Singapore is also commercially minded and keenly attuned to the zeitgeist of the commercial media world outside. This means that, insofar as the new media in particular are concerned, the government will continue to regulate them as far as possible without upsetting their commercial potential (Ang 1999: 114) .
With generational shifts and the increasing adoption of Internet and other infocomm services by Singaporeans, the Singapore government is keenly aware that it is impossible to maintain its monopolistic hold on the overall media sector. As we have argued in this paper, up to the General Election of 2006 it had tried its level best to fend off challenges to its power and authority by censorious means, albeit accompanied by 
